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I Introduction
The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (MCA) was signed into law by President Carter on
March 27, 1980. This act marks a new era in the banking and
-finance industry. One of the Provisions of this law
requires that the Federal Reserve System (The Fed)
discontinue its traditional Practice of offering Payment
services at zero cost to member banks? and offer priced
services to all depository institutions. A fundamental
consequence of the MCA is that there will no lonser be any
distinction between member and non-member banks. By
requiring the Fed to price its services the Consress
intended that competitive forces shape the national banking
payments service market and enhance the efficiency with
which banking services are delivered.
The task of pricing the Federal Reserve's services
places enormous pressure on the Fed. It must now redefine
and in fact Prove the very role it should Play as a Public
sector service Provider. This means the Fed must not only
articulate, but also cope with a different organizational
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Philosophy. The way the Fed manipulates its entire
management system in setting prices for services, wi i n
Part, shape this Philosophy. The Fed must reorient its
operation towards a market sensitive approach as it sel Is
its services, and confront the existing forces in the
competitive market. The Fed must be deliberate about
strategies of maintaining volume and increasing market
share. Any trade-off existins between these two strategies
will depend upon the flexibility implied by the Fed's
pricing Policy. In addition to its traditional role as
regulator, the Fed wilI now take on a more overt role as
compet i tor.
To the extent that the Fed is ultimately forced to cut
back some of its service capacity because of the market
response to its fee structure7 it must also face the
Potential role as service Provider of last resort. Although
somewhat beyond the scope of this analysis, it is important
to recognize the substantial impact the mandate of Fed
Pricing will have on the Fed's mode of operation as Provider
of financial Payment services, and on its status as a
service Provider relative to its Private sector competitors.
This Paper first will set out the historical context
-8-
that led to the formulation of the MCA and the specific
requirement of Fed pricing. Next, it will analyze the
existing management and budgeting system7 and explain how
costs were allocated to priced services. Third, it Will
consider how the Fed went about determining a rate of return
on its services given the MCA mandate to include in the fees
a mark-up representing the costs of taxes and financing that
the Fed would incur as a Private entity. Finally, it
considers the pricing theory applicable to the Fed's
approach towards setting a fee structure for services. This
will include a discussion of the merits of average cost and
marginal cost Pricing under different condit ions of supply
and demand. Consideration of these four aspects al low
Judgements to be made about how effective the Fed has been
in its effort to Price services "so as to enhance the
eff i: i ency of the nat ion' s Payments system. " 1 In tu rn, some
of the fundamental chanses which will improve the Fed's
Pricing scheme become evident.
An analysis of how the Fed determines its pricing
strategy telIs an interesting story about an asency which at
once must grapple with internal constraints of its own
manasement and budset i nis system, a requirement that it Price
-9-
its services at ful I cost7 the Shift ifn demand for its own
services in response to settins explicit fees, and the
overriding concern of the private sector that the Fed Price
its services "fairly".
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II A Transition From Free to Priced Services: Historical Trends
The formulation of the MCA was motivated by a
comb i nat i on of econom i c po it i a 1ca , and technol og i ca I
forces, which tosether cal led into question the role the
Federal Reserve should Play as the central bank, responsible
both as a regulator of monetary Pol icy and a "competitor",
providins Payment services to member banks. It was the
conversins of these forces that accelerated the trend of
member bank bai I-out, intensif ied the focus on the costs
rather than the benefits of Fed membership that made
increasingly apparent the issues of inter-bank equitY, and
spurred on the movement towards the mandate of Fed Pricing.
The MCA was ultimately a compromise law incorporating the at
times conflictins agendas of Consress, the Federal Reserve,
the Treasury, and the bankins community in seneral.
Issues of Fed Membership and Monetary Pricins Considerations
Over the Past decade, the Consress has considered a
variety of approaches to financial reform. A Primary focus
was on the Problem of member bank attrition from the Federal
- 11-
Reserve System and its impact on the ability of the Fed to
carry out monetary policy objectives. Both the number of
member banks leaving the system and the Percentase of total
bank depos i ts accounted for by member banks had stead i I y
decreased. Over the Past ten years 435 member banks had
withdrawn from the system, and onlY 103 had Joined. 2
Initially it was mostly smaller banks, with assets
under fifty million, that were leaving the system. During
the 1970's, larger banks with assets over one-hundred
mi I I ion were leaving the system at increasing rates. 3 The
underlying cause of this trend was the cost associated with
the reserve requirements imposed on member banks. Reserves
are non-interest bearing accounts held with the Fed in
exchange for free services and access to the discount
window. These reserves are an opportunity cost of
alternative interest bearing investments and are something
that banks naturally Wish to avoid.
Monetary Policy makes the reserve requirement issue an
important concern of the Federal Reserve System and the
Consress. There is a direct link between the amount of
reserves in the banking system and the Fed's ability to
- 12-
control the money supply and credit. Throush the Fed's open
market operat ions, the buy i ns and se I I i ns of U. S.
securities, the Fed influences the level of reserves in the
system. Buyins sovernment securities increases the volume
of reserves with which banks can lend. Selling Government
securities will tighten the money supply and decrease the
volume of funds available for credit. A Predictable reserve
base is necessary in order for the Fed to carry out its open
market operations. With fewer banks and a lower amount of
nationwide deposits as Part of the Federal Reserve System,
the Fed therefore, has less abi I ity to control money and
credit.
The role of reserve requirements in carrying out
monetary Policy is an issue around which there is continual
debate. in 1980, 70% of all commercial bank deposits were
held by member banks.4 This would seem to imply a
substantial ability by the Fed to control monetary
asresates. However, the Consress was more concerned with
the rate-of attrition and its Potential consequences.
Therefore, Proposals were called for which would stop the
trend of avoiding reserve requirements through attrition.
One Proposal would have required interest to be Paid on
-13-
reserves and another called for a sraduated set of reserve
requirements within a statutory ranse. A Proposal
introduced by the House Bankins Committee Chairman Henry S.
Reuss as H.R.13847 called for "universal reserve
reguirements".5 Both Senators Reuss and Proxmire introduced
subsequent modifications which resulted in the MCA Provision
of uniform, universal reguirements. With the universal
reserves requirement, the total amount of reserves would be
spread across a broader base of depository institutions.
There was also a Proposal for reduction in the reserve
ratio, such that the total amount of reserves held with the
Fed would be .ower.
-14,-
Reduction in the Reserve Base and the Concerns of the Treasury
The bankins community received this specific Provision
favorably. However7 the Treasury, another Party intimately
involved in the formulation of the MCA 7 was concerned about
any decrease in the absolute level of reserves held
nationwide: Both the Treasury and the Consress recognized
that a lower level of absolute reserves might translate into
a revenue loss to the Treasury. The Treasury's support for
Fed Pricing in part was because the revenues senerated from
service fees would offset the potential loss in earnings
caused by a lower revenue base.
The basis of the Treasury's viewpoint is best
understood by considering the not so obvious I ink between
the level of asresate reserves and the cost of borrowins to
the Treasury, and the flow of net earnings each year from
the Fed to the Treasury. Throush the Fed's buying and
selling of Government securities it manipulates the level of
reserves and the money supply. The Fed draws down the
reserve base throush the Purchase of a sovernment security.
If a lower total reserve base exists, the Fed Will hold
Proportionately fewer sovernment securities. In turn, the
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Public will hold more. To the extent that more publicly
held debt bids down the Price of bonds, their correspondins
yields will increase. In turn, the Treasury will be forced
to finance Proportionately more of its debt by borrowing
from the Public--at the higher rate of interest. Therefore,
fewer total reserves cause a by-product of increased
borrowins costs to the Treasury. It is in this way that net
earnings to the Treasury may decline. It should be pointed
out that the actual change in the ratio of sovernment held
securities at the Fed because of the induced change in the
reserve base, is unlikely to be very substantial, and the
increased costs to the Treasury - if any - quite small. (A
more obvious relationship is between the net Treasury
revenues earned from the Fed7 and the Fed's own earnings
from its entire operation as regulator of monetary Policy
and as a provider of priced services.)
The reason the mandate of Fed Pricing was assumed to
helP offset the Potential loss of revenues to the Treasury
becomes relatively straishtforward. The Fed returns the
majority of its interest earnings each year to the Treasury.
Prior to the MCA, the revenues the Fed funneled back to the
Treasury did not include the fees (cost recovery) from its
service operation. With the mandate of Fed Pricing and full
cost recovery, the Fed in effect will senerate an additional
source of income to contribute towards its cost of
operations. Any savings in operating costs that result from
the service fees, will become an additional source of
revenue to the Treasury. That is, the Fed will need to keep
less interest income to cover its operating costs because it
will be supporting a lower cost of operation. The
Congressional records indicate that the initiation of Fed
Pricing was, in Part, intended to offset any loss in
earnings to the Treasury.
-17-
Recent Trends Shapins the Provision for Fed Pricing
There have also been various trends Which essentially
forced the issue of Fed Pricing into the forefront of
Congressional deliberations. First, foresone investment
opportunities because of the sterile reserve requirement are
exacerbated when interest rates rise and the cost of federal
funds and Treasury Bills increase. For example, during the
period between 1971 and 1981, the prime rate rose from 5.72%
to 18.87%, and six month T-Bills from 4.5% to 13.8%. 6
Second, member banks were Placed at a competitive
disadvantase With recent financial innovations in the form
of transaction related interest bearins deposits such as
NOW'S, POW'S, and telephone transfers from savings deposits.
This development fostered enormous competitive pressure on
the bankins community for deposit funds. Member banks,
being financially squeezed from membership burdens, were
less able to offer interest bearing accounts as an
inducement to customers.
Third, the increased competition in the bankins
industry and the pressure to control operating costs made
-18-
the burden of reserve requirements more onerous. Reserve
requirements are considered a significant cause of the
historic earnings difference between member and non-member
banks.
Fourth, the cost of membership was increased by the
enhanced quality and greater efficiency of correspondent
bank service Provision. In turn, some of the services
provided free by the Fed seemed of less value.
Correspondents besan to offer check collection services
requiring less Pre-sortins, less strinsent cutoff times for
check processsins, and more immediate availability of funds
than did the Fed. Respondent banks could therefore obtain
better service from their correspondent banks. Some
respondent banks were Precluded from usins the.Fed because
of their remoteness from a Federal Reserve office. Member
banks as well have increasingly relied upon correspondent
banks for the Provision of certain services. The Fed did
improve the efficiency in its check collection service
throush the establishment of Resional Check Processins
Centers CRCPC's). However, this service was avai lable to
non-members as wel I as members, and therefore7 added to the
relative costs associated with membership. 7
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Finally, one of the more significant factors which
increasingly cal led attention to the costs and inequities
associated with Fed membership was that any non-member bank
had access to to the Fed services simply by operating
through a member bank correspondent. The correspondent bank
would access services free of charge from the Fed7 Ci.e. 7
check collection services, wire transfer services, cash
services). A non-member bank, typically a respondent bank,
could then receive these services from their correspondent
either free of charse or at a subsidized rate. In this way,
larger correspondent banks could somewhat offset the cost of
reserves and respondent banks could take advantage of
cheaper services which at times reflected a hisher level of
quality than would have been provided throush the Fed. In
light of all of these factors it is no real surprise that
the mandate of uniform., universal reserve requirements and
Fed Pricing received a very mixed reaction; The desree of
acceptance depended upon the relative burdens of holding
reserves in the pre- and post- MCA environment, balanced
asainst the additional costs incurred because of Fed
Pr ic i ns.
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Free Services and Efficiency Concerns
When the Federal Reserve System was created in 1914, it
was charged with the responsibility of "furnishing an
elastic currency, to afford a means of rediscountins
commercial papers, and establishins a more efficient
supervision of bankins". In order to assure the efficient
functioning of the national Payments system the Federal
Reserve was authorized to Provide services free of charse or
at a subsidized rate. The very first services to be
Provided were check col lection and discount services. Since
that time the number and volume of Fed services has steadily
increased.
Prior to the MCA the services Provided free of charse
to al I member banks and a few non-member banks were:
1) Operation of Payments system, including check
processins, and transportation,
2) Automated clearins house services,
3) Purchase7 sale, safekeepins, and clearing of federal
securities,
- 21-
4)
5)
6)
7)
1)
9)
10)
Wire transfers,
Bank examinations for state member banks and holding
company i nspect i ons,
Pick up and delivery of coins and currency,
Operation of the discount window7
Operation of the Resional Check Processing Centers,
Provision of certain bank advisory services,
Provision of a variety of business, financial, and
seneral information on current economic events. 9
The availablity of these services is the primary advantase
for maintainins membership in the Federal Reserve System.
The trends since the Fed was created in 1914 leading to
member bank attrition were not foreseen by Consress.
Althoush the Problems which were increasingly associated
With the reserve requirements became causal lY linked to the
mandate for Fed Pricins, arsuments focusins on efficiency
grounds alone were increasingly heard durins the Past
decade. In 1974, three Fed employees wrote an article
entitled "Pr icins and the role of Fed in an electronic funds
transfer system." This article stated that:
"The Federal Reserve must charse full cost for all
-22-
services Provided if private orsanizations are to have
real options of developins lower cost alternatives. If
the Federal Reserve provided services free of charse,
it would undermine private initiative which is so vital
for increased innovation and efficiency... .Full cost
Pricins will insure that the financial community wil I
always have the option of developins alternative ways
of hand I i ng t ransfe rs. P rese rvat ion of Pub I i c and
Private options should Provide insurance against the
almost inevitable slussishness which tends to develop
in larse service orsanizations." 10
Just how inefficient the Fed is as a service provider
because of the inherent characteristics of the Public sector
is debatable. It may be that the more important variable
influencing efficiency is the Pervasiveness of competition.
Nonetheless7 the Point is that offerins free services
results in the overuse of some services and inhibits the
likely effort towards lower cost Provision of services,
innovation, and more efficient ways of usins society's
scarce resources.
Miller, then Secretary of the Treasury andWiIIi amt G.
-23-
later Chairman of the Board, used this very arsument when he
was actively involved in developins the terms of the MCA.
Paul Volker also supported the notion of the efficiency of
Fed Pricing. This became crucial in the deliberations with
the Treasury because of their concern with the potential
loss in Treasury revenues resultins from the universal
reserve requirements.1lMoreover, the banks themselves besan
to raise the efficiency issue.
Consider for example the comments of the President of
the Philadephia First National Bank:
"In 1976, Philadelphia National, as Part of its
competitive effort to obtain new correspondent bankins
business, worked out an arransement with four banks in
the Johnstown7 PA, area to provide certain check
clearins and check transportation services that were
then unavailable from the Federal Reserve System and
which other private institutions had chosen to offer
competitively. After the agreement had been worked out
in detail, the Philadephia Federal Reserve Bank,
notified of it, intervened and offered the identical
service to the four banks at no direct cost to them.
Naturally, the four banks chose the Federal Reserve's
In order to Prov ide the service, theoffer over ours.
Federal Reserve had to incur costs that I am convinced
we could have met - had the Federal Reserve been
required to charse a fair price for the service. In
this instance, the Federal Reserve directly undercut a
Private initiative, Presumably to engender the sood
Will of four banks, and in so doins Provided a de facto
subsidy to those institutions funded by the local
Federal Reserve's profits on the interest free reserve
balance required to be maintained with it by district
members, includins ourselves." 12
Although the Fed did not typically engase in such
unscrupulous business Practices, the fact that it could
potentially "undermine such Private sector initiatives"
alluded to the realization that such Practices could become
more common as the Fed continued to experience a decline in
both membership, and demand for some of its services.
Moreover, this experience made obvious the unfair
competitive advantase beins granted to the Fed as a Public
sector regulator of monetary Policy.
It slowly became clear that the Fed's role as the
central bank could be detached from its role as a depository
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institution. That is, the Fed's responsibilities as a
resu lator of monetary Po icy need not descr iminatel y impose
restictions and costs on depository institutions throush the
reserve requirements so that these institutions may in turn
benefit from the Provision of free Fed services. At the
same t i me, it was c lear that the Fed cou I d not adopt a
Policy of simultaneously imposing costs of reserve
requirements and chargins for its services. This would
create obvious interbank inequity. Given the desire to
reduce the inefficiencies imposed by the Provision of
services at zero cost, and the need for stability in the
reserve base, a dual policy was required which would Provide
open access to Fed services and mandatory reserve
requ i rements for al I depository inst itut ions.
This line of thinkins was formalized in a 1976 report
by the Ad Hoc Task Force on Access to Services, which stated
that the most effective way of granting access to al I
financial institutions was to charse explicit fees for
services and require all depository institutions to hold
reserves with the Fed. This was intended to solve the
membership Problem, improve the efficiency of the national
Payments system, and assist in Prevent ins what were
-26-
considered unfair pricins practices. Five Years later
Consress Passed the landmark MCA, which, amons other things,
provided that the Fed must Price its services and compete
"to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the national
financial service mechanism and better monitor assregates."
The Provisions of the act Which Will directly
facilitate the implementation of these obJectives are:
1) The abolition of Resulation Q through an orderly
Phase-out and ultimate elimination of alI limitations
on deposit interest rates.
2) Mandatory reserve requirements for all depository
institutions.
3) Universal access to Fed services and the requirement
that they be explicity priced.1 3
The Fed's Present task is the implementation of the
mandate of Fed Pricins. We will now consider how the Fed
manipulated its existing manasement and budgetins system in
order to determine the explicit fees for priced services.
-27-
III. The Federal Reserve System's Manasement and Budset System
- ------------------------------------------------------------
The Plannins and Control System (PACS):Structure/Purpose
The Purpose of a cost accounting system is to measure,
in monetary terms, the quantity of resources utilized to
carry out a specific objective or Purpose. Cost accountins
is, therefore, a management tool which can be used in
budsetins, Performance evaluation, or price setting.
In 1977 the Fed adopted the Planning and Control System
(PACS) method of cost accounting. PACS is a full cost
system, which means that both direct costs and a fair share
of indirect costs are allocated to specific activity
centers. Direct costs are those expenses which are incurred
solely to accomplish a specific objective. Indirect costs
are those expenses which are shared by more than one
activity-- such as support services and other overhead
items. These are commonly referred to as Joint costs.
Any cost accountins system must approximate the Proper
allocation of the indirect costs because of the difficulty
-28-
in distinguishins between the share of overhead items spent
on particular activities. A rule-of-thumb method of
allocation may be used, such as square-foot of floor space,
sa I es, or d i rect costs. Somet i mes space and d i rect costs
together, or some other combination or proxies maybe used.
Sometimes more sophisticated studies are undertaken to make
more Precise allocations of indirect costs. There are, of
courSe, costs associated with gaining better information on
the true al location of indirect costs, and the management
Problem is to weish the expense of implementins a more
sophisticated and complex system against the benefits of
having better cost data.
The Fed's PACS system was adopted Prior to the
inception of the MCA, and thus was tai lored to a set of
internal data needs that were somewhat different than those
that exist today. In seneral, PACS is better at Providing
broad budseting data and cost control information than it is
at identifying the full costs of specific services. In
Part, this is a Problem of levels of aggresation--because
PACS provides information on whole categories of services
whereas for pri'cing Purposes it is necessary to unbundle
-29-
these catesories into more discrete items.
PACS Cost Allocation and Allocation to Priced Services
PACS itself has three essential levels of
disassregation of cost data. First, the Fed breaks out its
costs into seven Output System Service lines, which are the
broad catesories of responsibility of the Fed. They
include: Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Services to the United
States Treasury and Government Asencies, Services to
Financial Institutions and the Public, Supervision and
Regulation, Support Services, and Overhead Services.
Amons the responsibilities of the Fed, only one System
Line is to be priced--namelY, Financial Services. PACS
breaks down Financial Services into six service lines, which
are the Prosrams to carry out the Fed's responsibilities.
They include: Commercial Check Processins, Coin and
Currency, Electronic Payments Mechanism.
Each of these service lines are finally broken down
into activities which are the specific operations required
to carry out the Particular programs. For example, under
the Commercial Check Processing Service Line there are four
-30-
activities, including: check processins, fine sort,
returns, and adjustments. (See Figure 1, Pase 31).
After the MCA was Passed in 1980, the Fed appointed a
"Pr icins Pol icy Task Force" 7 (PPTF) to assist the Fed in
meeting the mandates of the Act. Amons other things, the
PPTF reviewed the PACS and designed a series of Pricing
Worksheets which are used to step-down the PACS data so that
it is useful in determining full costs for services to be
Priced under the MCA.
In essence, the pricing worksheets add an additional
level of disassresation within the activities so that they
can be broken down into smaller categories which reflect
different costs. For example, the Pricing worksheet for
commercial check processing creates six smaller service
catesories that will be separately priced. This is shown
schematical ly in Fisure 2 on Pase 3Z. It is worth noting
that the lowest level of cost disassresation is still the
"activity" 7 althoush the relevant level for pricing is Just
one below the "activity". That is, the bank buying the
services from the Fed does not Pay four separate fees to
have checks Processed, adJusted7 returned, and fine sorted,
- 31-
FIGURE 1
Step-Down of Fed Cost Data Under PACS
Output System
Services Line
Output System
Service Line
To Be Priced
Service Line
Activity
Leve I
I
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FIGURE 2
Step-Down Cost Allocation To Priced Services
Output System Financial Service
Service Line Line
Service Line Commercial Overhead -
Check D i rect and
Process i ng Support
Activity Processing djustmen Retur
Level and Fine Sort
Priced Services
Deposit Types City Country Other on- ackas G
RCPC Fed Machinabl Sort S
Mi xed
PSAF % x% X% X%
xx xx xxPer Item Fees xx Xx Xxx
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but rather one fee for everything. The activities are
simply the various things that the Fed does to provide a
siven type of service. The Fed charses for City checks
rather than four separate charses for the different things
it does to process City checks.
This new level of disassresation which has been
developed with the Pricing worksheets provides the best cost
data for Pricing. A service which is soins to be priced is
identified and broken out unbundled from the larser "service
linle" provided by the PACS. The costs of the various
activities are allocated downwards to the new service
catesory. This is the full cost of Providing a particular
service. The Fed then takes the full cost and marks it up
by the Private Sector Adjustment Factor 7 (PSAF), to impute
private sector capital costs. This is the unit price or fee
which is charsed.
Evaluation of the Pricins Worksheet
Whether or not this Procedure wi I I provide the Fed with
a Price that reflects the true economic cost of Providing
the service depends on the method used to allocate activity
-34-
costs to the Priced services, Plus the appropriateness of
the PSAF mark-up.
An initial review of the Procedures used by the Fed in
at locatirns the activity costs amons services reveaIs that in
some cases simple rule-of-thumb a location methods have been
used, whereas in other cases the Fed has used more detailed
studies to determine the cost allocation. For example, in
commercial check processins, four out of the six
sub-catesories have activity costs allocated on the basis of
volume, whi le two catesories have costs al located on the
basis of time-motion studies. (Refer to Appendix I on the
Pricing Worksheet for further detail.) A closer look at
check processins costs raises a number of questions about
the cost accounting Procedures used.
First, at times, a charse may reflect the costs of an
activity not associated with its processins. A particular
example of this is the allocation of the activity costs for
returns and adJustments. These costs were allocated across
alI deposit types. However, not all items require returns
or adJustments. Therefore, all users of the Fed's check
Processins services must bear the costs for returns and
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adJ ustments even thoush at I users do not i mpose such costs
on the processins operation.
Second, there are some instances where the same fees
are charsed for an item, but there are significant
differences in the respective processing costs. The most
slaring example is that three deposit types, Mixed7
Countryand RCPC, were all lumPed tosether for pricing
purposes.(See glossary for definition of deposit types.)
Third, the process employed for the al location of
overhead adheres strictly to the assumption that each
deposit type requires the same level of overhead related
resources. But, Just as there are variations in the
resource requirements for processins different deposit
types, there are also differences in the amount of overhead
that should be reflected in the separate charses for deposit
types. Given that the PACS initially assresates overhead at
the output service line level, the step-down of costs first
to the check activity and then across to the Priced
services, adds to an already somewhat arbitrary process of
overhead allocation. To the extent Possible, an overhead
allocation scheme should recognize different resource
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requirements for Providing services.For example 7 both
non-machinable cash letters and mixed cash letters require
that more resources be devoted to their processins than the
other deposit types. The Present method of assignins
overhead costs to Priced services ends up not allocating
enoush costs to these items and too many costs to other
deposit types.
Appendix 1 Provides a detailed discussion of the
Pricing Worksheet and exactly how costs were allocated to
Priced services. The different kinds of ratios used to
allocate the costs of various activities and the overhead
al location methods are explained. Much of the Problem in
derivins efficient Prices through the Pricins Worksheet is
related to the way that the PACS initially catesorized costs
for the Fed's manasement Purposes in the "pre-MCA"
environment. As the Fed's management objectives chansed,
its accountins and budsetins system must be reoriented as
well-- away from a one-sided focus on cost minimization
towards matching revenues and costs.
Some of the initial restructuring of the Pricins
Worksheet i tse I f cou I d i mprove some of the a I I ocat ion of
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costs to Priced services. The Fed could also define certain
of the deposit types as "activities" or Shift to a more
uniform standard cost approach.1 5 1n seneraI, it is
recommended that all deposit types be priced separately
because there are sufficient differences in their processins
requirements to justify different charses for each deposit
type.
Havins observed the Problems of usins the PACS to
allocate actual Fed costs to Priced services, and the
resulting Pitfalls, it is now appropriate to turn to another
question--namely, how accurately does the Fed allocate
imputed costs to priced services? That is, how are capital
costs imputed by the Fed?
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IV The Private Sector Adjustment Factor (PSAF)
Why the PSAF?
Accordins to the Monetary Control Act, the Fed must
price its services so as "to give due regard to competitive
16
factors." This has been construed to mean that the Fed
should not price its services strictly according to its
costs, but should make certain adJustments to account for
its non-market costs of capital. That is, since the Fed
does not have to raise capital in the Private debt and
equity markets, and since it does not Pay taxes, the cost of
its invested capital is Much lower than its competition in
the private sector. In order to address this concern, the
Fed has proposed a Private Sector AdJustment Factor, known
as the PSAF7 which imputes the cost of financing and taxes
that would have been incurred, if it were a private sector
ent i ty.
-39-
Derivation of the PSAF
Once the decision was made to impute the costs of
financing for the Fed in determining a fair Price to charse
for its services, the task of Picking a Proper cost of
capital remained. The Fed decided to use the weighted
averase of the costs of debt and equity of a sample of
twelve large bank service corporations, which Provide a
variety of services, including some of those that the Fed
must price under the new regulatory laws. Based on a 1979
survey, the Fed estimated that the cost of short term debt
was 10.44%7 long term debt cost was 8.66% and equity return,
sross of income taxes, was 22.7%.17
Next, the Fed estimated its total assets which should
be allocated to the priced services. The Fed's asset
accounts were divided into short-lived and lons-lived asset
catesories which were all valued at historic cost. Excluded
from the asset base were the value of all assets used by the
Fed to carry out its function as the central bank, its
supervisory and resulatory responsibilities7 and its role as
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a fiscal agent of the Treasury.
The asset accounts chosen to represent assets used in
the Production of priced services were the following:
SHORT-LIVED
Difference and Suspense, Net - All cash itemS in the
process of collection7 including the float.
Adjustments, Net - What in 1981 were catesorized as
Difference and Suspense accounts.
Accrued service revenue - A new post-MCA account
representins an accounts receivable for all Priced
services.The account was not included in the 1981
PSAF calculation.
Materials and Supplies - Operating inventory for all
priced services. This account was left out of the
1981 the PSAF calculations due to error.
LONG-LIVED ASSETS
Bank Premisesnet
Furniture and equipmentnet
Other real estate
The next step was to calculate the share of the total
asset base Which should be allocated to the priced services.
The Fed accomplished this by allocating its assets to
services on the basis of the ProJected operatins expenses.
That is, the ratio of the operating expenses for priced
services to the Fed's total operating expenses is assumed to
be a fair Proxy for the Percent of the Fed's total asset
base devoted to usetfor the Priced services. Using this
method the Fed estimated that 43% of its total asset
accounts would be allocated to Priced services.
The Fed's total asset accounts are $660 mil lion. Of
this, $137.5 mi II ion are short-I ived and $522 mi I I ion were
long-lived assets. Next, the Fed assumed that the Proper
debt.to equity ratio for the long-lived assets would be
30:70. Thus, the short-lived assets allocated to Priced
services are $137.5 x .43 = 59; the imputed equity is $522
x.43 x.30 = 67; and the imputed lons term debt is $522 x .43
x .70 = 158.18
-41-
-42-
Based on these Parameters the Fed estimated the total
costs of capital for the priced services as follows:
Table I: Weighted Cost of Imputed Capital
ASSET
Short-Lived Assets
Imputed short term debt
Lonser-Lived Assets
Imputed lons-term debt
Imputed equity
$59. E
67.5
158.0
285.0
Annual cost of Annual cost of
capital as a % capital
10.44% $6.2
8.66
22.7
5.8
35.9
47.9
Weighted Cost of Imputed Capital=47.9/284=16.8%
The PSAF, however, is not the annual cost of capital
allocated to the priced services (16.8%)7 but rather a
number which estimates the financine costs as a mark-up over
operating costs. That is, the figure derived for the annual
cost of capital ($47.9) is divided by the annual operating
costs--rather than the asset base. Based on cost estimates
from the Fed's accounting Division, operating costs for the
priced services are pesed at $310.7. This results in a
PSAF of 15.4%, (i.e., $47.9/ 310.7).
Evaluating the PSAF
"Pre-MCA" the Fed's role was unique amons financial
service operations. It provided services free of charge.
It did not have any need to calculate an asset base measured
bY the value of priced services, to determine an appropriate
rate of return on its capital assets, or to decide whether
to value assets at historic or current cost for Purposes of
pricing. The use of the PSAF brings all these issues to the
forefront. There are Probl ems associated with defining the
asset base; and a Plethora of approaches to setting a return
considered adequate and reasonable with respect to the asset
base.
Now that the Fed has embarked on a new strategy for
pricing its services, including its imputed capital costs,
the question remains, Just how suitable is the Fed's
approach? To evaluate this question, three crucial issues
need examination. First, has the Fed imputed the correct
capital structure? Second, is it Proper to use the pre-tax
return on equity of the twelve bank sample as the cost of
capital for the priced services? And thirdly, should the
PSAF be a mark-up on operating costs rather than invested
capital?
The Capital Structure
As noted above, the Fed has constructed a hypothetical
debt equity structure for the priced services. From Table
17 it can be seen that the capital structure-consists of 55%
equity, 24% long term debt, and 21% short term debt. The
Fed used the 12 bank sample to derive its capital structure,
but it did not simply adopt the actual capital structure of
the banks.
Banks finance assets through demand and savings
deposits as well as debt and equity. When debt, equity and
deposits are taken into account, the share of equity in the
asset base of the twelve bank sample is only 2% to 5%. 19
. When the PSAF was first proposed, the Fed wanted to use
a much larser share of debt in its hypothetical asset base7
due to the small amount of equity in the banks' actual
capital structure. This was a controversial issue because
the Price of equity is based on pre-tax returns to
shareholders, and typically runs from two to three times the
cost of debt. A small share of equity thus tended to lower
the PSAF mark-up.
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A better approach for the Fed would be to estimate the
debt-equity ratio for the Portion of a bank's balance sheet
which is related to the sale of correspondence services.
Koot and Walker susest that this "would Probably show about
60% debt and 40% equity." 20To illustrate how a difference of
this magnitude would chanse the PSAF mark-up, the Fed's
capital costs are reconstructed using the same debt and
eqity Prices, but with the equity share reduced from 55% to
40%.
TABLE 2: Cost of Capital With 60:40 Debt:Equity Ratio
Annual cost of
capital as a %
Annual Cost of
capital
Short term debt
(Table 1, line 1)
Lons term debt
(225.5 - (285).4)
Equity
(285 X .4)
Weighted cost
PSAF = 41.8 /
59.5
111.5
10.44 $6.2
8.66 $9.7
114.0 22.7 $25.9
285.0 41.8
of capital = 41.8 / 285 = 14.67%
310.7 = 13.45%
Thus, it can be seen that a reduction in the imputed
Asset
-46-
equity share from 55% to 40% reduces the PSAF from 15.5%-to
13.45%, holding interest rates and return to equity constant.
The bankins community sucessfully lobbied asainst this
Proposal, however, and ultimately the Fed adopted a
different approach. First, it assumed a matched capital
structure. All of the Fed's short term assets were assumed
to be financed by short term debt and al I the Iong term
debts were assumed to be financed by equity and long term
debt. The rationale for this chanse was that the Fed's
imputed capital structure should be related to the actual
assets devoted to the Provision of the priced services.
As noted, short term assets were assumed to be financed
by short term debt. The long term assets, however, were
financed by both equity and debt, and the Fed has to decide
how much would be hypothetical ly financed by each item. In
the end7 the Fed simply took the 12 bank sample, eliminated
the entire deposit base? and then used the ratio of long
term debt to equity. This was as noted, 30:70. 21
Thus, the Fed started with the 12 bank sample to
22
determine the proper asset base, then abandoned the sample
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to adopt the "matching" capital structure, and final ly,
returned to the 12 bank sample to determine the Proper ratio
of long term debt to equity. The result is a system which
is neither typical of the actual capital structure of banks,
nor truly "matched" to the services Provided.
The Return to Capital
The question of the Proper return to capital invested
in the Provision of the priced services is central. The Fed
has simply taken the averase debt and equity returns for the
twelve bank sample and assumed that this is the cost of
capital for the Priced services. But, as noted earlier, the
twelve bank sample has an unusual capital structure which is
highly leverased with deposits. In addition, a price for
debt or equity under one capital structure will not
necessarily be appropriate for another one. This is
particularly relevant here where the banks in the sample are
typically financed by less than 5Y equity.
Moreover, the banks in the sample offer a broad ranse
of services which are not being offered by the Fed;
individual and business demand and savings deposits7 CD'S7
commercial and consumer loans, housins mortgages, credit
cards, money orders and the I ike. The data from the sample
are averased across different services. If it is more risky
to Provide some services than others, the return to capital
will also vary.
One method of evaluating the Proper rate of return is
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the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM is a
theoretical approach to measuring the expected return on a
given asset based on the relationship between the variance
of returns on a Particular investment and the variance of
returns to the market as a whole. Simply Put, CAPM assumes
that investors can reduce risk through diversification. By
holding several stocks, the fluctuations of a particular
Stock is offset bY the variance of other stocks. Risk,
however, is not completely diversifiable, as the entire
market has ups and downs, and the Portfol io misht thus be
subJect to fluctuations in the business cycle. CAPM divides
risk into two categories. systematic and non-systematic.
Systematic risk is the risk associated with the market as a
whole, while non-systematic risk is the unique risk
associated with a particular business enterprise. Investors
are assumed to be rewarded for bearing systematic risk, but
not unsystematic risk which can be diversified away. The
actual reward or risk Premium for a siven investment is a
function of the desree to which the stock variance is
correlated with the market as a whole. The greater the
tendency for the investment to move with the market, the
greater the non-diversifiable risk. The more independent
the vari-ance - the less risky is the investment.
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More specifically, CAPM is used to derive a market cost
of capital (rm), which is a function of the risk free rate
Cr), 7earned Simply by Pu.rchasing a U.S. Treasury Bi 1l the
risk Premium (rt- rf), and beta, the degree of fluctuation
of a particular portfolio with resPect to the market as a
whole. The premium represents the extra return the investor
obtains by holding some portion of the market portfolio, or
in other words, by bearing systematic risk. The lower the
beta of the Portfolio, the lower Will be the Premium earned
above the risk-free rate.
Investments Which tend to be sensitive to the business
cycle contain a greater degree of systematic risk, and hence
require a greater risk Premium. Examples of such industries
include the computer industrY, real estate, automobi les, or
Primary metal s7 all of which are dependent upon the economy
as a whole. Industries where risks are entirely random, and
are not related at all to the rest of the economy, would in
theorY, require a risk Prem iumn of zero, and a rate of return
about the same as the T-Bi I t rate.
A number of factors wi I I determine how much systematic
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risk the Fed's services would face if they were Provided in
the Private sector. For example, Just how volatile is the
demand for check Processing services, and how much are
chanses in demand correlated with changes in economic
activity? What are the characteristics of the technology
used to process checks, and what is the relatonship between
the Fed's fixed and variable costs?
Perhaps more to the Point, do the services to be priced
by the Fed contain more or less systematic risk than the
average systematic risk of the twelve bank sample or the
economy in seneral? 2 For example, is check processing more
or less sensitive to the business cycle than credit related
services such as consumer and business loans? If it is
possible to determine the level of risk inherent in the
Processins of checks with respect to the seneral economY7 it
would be feasible to impute a value for beta which would
reflect the fluctuation of check volume over time with
general economic activity. If it can be speculated that
check Processins is a low risk activitY, then a low estimate
of beta would be appropriate.
To set a first approximation for this question, we
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compare the volume of check processing, one of the major
services offered bY the Fed, to the volume of commercial
bank loans, over the seven Year period of 1973 to 1979. In
table 3, the Percentage changes in check processing and
commercial bank loans are compared to the Percentage chanses
in the GNP. Both the GNP and the commercial bank loans are
expressed in constant dollars.
An initial inspection of Table 3 sussests that the
volume of checks Processed by the Fed has grown at a steady
rate, while both the GNP and the volume of commecial bank
loans took a severe dip during the recession of 1974-75. To
set a better look at the relationship between the chanses in
the GNP and check volume and loan volume, a regression model
was constructed for both check volume and loan volume, where
chanse in the GNP was the independent variable. The results
are shown in Table 4.
The results of the regression are striking. Check
Processins is a very poor fit, With a GNP coefficient of .6
and an R-squared value of .192. Less than 20% of the
variance of changes in the volume of Check processins can be
explained bY changes in the GNP. On the other hand 7 the
volume of commercial bank loans is shown to be much more
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TABLE 3
Percent chanses in the volume of check Processins,
commercial bank loans, and GNP 1973-1979.
. real chanse
GNP
5.8
-. 6
-1. 1
5.4
5.5
4.8
3.2
change check - real chanse
volume commercial loans
17.6 12.9
8.0 0.0
5.6 -5.5
7.9 5.0
8.1 10.3
6.0 11.2
7.1 14.09
Sources:
Economic Report of the President, January, 1981.
U.S Government Printins Office, Washinston. D.C.
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1980. U.S. Department of
Commerce? Bureau of the Census. P.539
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, "A Quantitative Description
of the Check Collection System"? Volume I, p. 97-99.
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
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TABLE 4
Changes in the volume of check processing and
commercial bank loans as a function of changes in the GNP:
1) % change in volume of Fed check Processins
= 6.6 + .6 (% change in GNP)
R-Squared = .192
2) % change in volume of commercial bank loans
= .224 + 2.04 ( change in GNP)
R-Squared = .67
Commercial bank loans and GNP are in constant dollars
Data from the Years 1973-79. When the Years 1970 to
1972 were added to the check processins models the GNP
coefficient fell to .4 and variance value dropped to .1.
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dependent upon chanses in the GNP. The GNP coefficient for
the commercial loan equation is 2.047 and the r-squared
value is .67. About two thirds of the variance in the
volume of bank loans is related to chanses in the GNP.
Although this is hardly the final word in evaluating
the relative systematic risk for the two lines of servi ces,
one can speculate that the check processing services are
indeed less risky than commercial loans, Siven the
assumptions of the CAPM model. It also appears that less
volatility is associated with check processing than the
economy in general. There is little correlation between
chanses in check volume over time and chanses in the economy
in seneral. This all implies that the likely ranse of
values for a "fair" rate of return on Check services, that
the Fed might require, should approach the risk-free rate.
It may be that the Fed should monitor the risk-free rate and
adJust the PSAF accordinsly--that is, With respect to the
check processing service line.
In seneral, it would be a rather simple task for the
Fed to undertake a more thoroush review of the various
services offered by the Fed, to assess the desree of
systematic risk they carry, and to compare that to the
credit related services offered by commercial banks. If
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further analysis supports the hypothesis that the Priced
services embody less systematic risk than the average
services offered by the commercial bank sample, the rate of
return should be adJusted downward.
Mark-up Pricing
One of the more interesting features of the Fed's
pricing policy is the decision to make the PSAF a mark-up of
operating costs, rather than invested capital. The Fed has
constructed a complicated system for determining its imputed
capital structure, and the price of debt and equity. But
rather than use this data to explicitly allocate capital
costs to the various services, the Fed simply takes the
total capital costs for all services and divides this number
by the total operating costs for all services. The result,
the PSAF, is a number used to gross up averase operating
costs so that the margin of Price over operating costs will
cover the Fed's imputed capital costs.
Operating costs are likely to be easier to allocate
among services than capital, and this alone Probably
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explains the PSAF system. But there is Precious little else
to recommend the method. It is highly unlikely that alI the
services, or for that matter, any two, have the same ratio
of operating to capital costs. This means that some
services are being priced too high, While others are Priced
too low. Moreover, as the new prices induce changes for
demand for services, the PSAF rate will have to be revised.
If the services which are priced too high are effectively
priced out of the market, the total capital costs will have
to be allocated among a narrower base of services, and to
the degree that disparities in the ratio of operating to
capital expenses persist, Yet another sroup of services may
be priced out of the market.
We have now considered the allocation of actual and
imputed costs to priced services. Next we turn to another
aspect of the analysis. Specifically, we ask, even if the
Fed did al locate its costs both actual and imputed, Just how
should it Price its services? That is, what economic
principles guide the Fed in its overall pricing scheme, and
would a change -in Pricing structure result in welfare
efficiency gains for society?
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V The Economics Of Public Pricing
Averase Cost Pricing and Interteiporal AdJustment
So far we have examined the historical developments
leading up to the MCAR the chanses the Fed has implemented
in its cost accountins system to accomodate the new data
needs created by the Act7 and the method used to impute
Private sector capital costs. We have seen that the
Consress wants the Fed to Phase in a fee for service system
that will promote efficiency and to encourase Private sector
provision of some or all of the services now Provided by the
Fed. In this section we evaluate the Fed's use of a total
averase cost pricing strategy to achieve these objectives.
The easiest way to understand the rationale for averase
cost Pricing by the Federal Reserve, is to observe that
little or no consideration was siven to any alternatives.
The record sussests that the Fed was Primarily concerned
with the fundamental question of whether or not to charse
any fees at al l, and once a decision was made on that front,
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the fact that fees should equal averase total costs was
taken as Siven. Indeed, much of the initial debate over the
fee setting mechanism concerned the Proper definition of
total costs.
For example, the PSAF discussed earlier, was created to
impute a cost that was incurred by the private sector. A
system which ignored the special tax advantases of the Fed
tended to result in allocative inefficiencies, as the Fed
could underprice its competition unfairly. A number of
other total cost issues were also discussed. The Fed wanted
to Price its services in such a way that it would cover its
Ions-run total costs. That is, the Fed Proposed that Prices
need not cover total costs in the short-run so long as the
Pricins strategy was designed to cover total costs over some
longer and unspecified time frame. The larse Private sector
correspondent banks have opposed this. They argued that
such an open ended restriction would allow the Fed to engase
in Predatory pricins practices as prices would be dropped in
the short run in order to eliminate competition, and then
raised.
There were however, at least two counter arsuments for
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allowins the Fed intertemporal flexibility in setting
prices. First, it was pointed out that once the Fed
introduced fees, the demand for its Present services would
decline. For example, once fees were introduced, the volume
of checks Processed by the Fed actually declined by about
This sharp decline in demand left the Fed with excess
capacity for check processing. A policy of strict total
cost pricins would have required the Fed to increase its
check processins fees in order to Pay for the idle capacity.
This in turn would have led to Yet another reduction in
demand, and even more idle capacity. Thus, the Fed was
faced with the Prospect of a vicious spiral of Price
increases and newly idled capacity, while both averase and
marsinal variable costs remained below the Price. Only a
policy of Pricing to meet the Ions-run total cost would
allow the Fed to undertake an orderly adJustment
environment created by its own Pricins policies.
to the new
The second counter arsument concerned new services and
new technolosies which enjoyed economies of scale over a
relevant ranse of output. The Fed needed the flexibility to
set prices below their initial total costs, so that enough
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volume could be built up to allow the Fed to realize those
lower unit costs, and thus to establish the new service.
The debate over the PSAF and the time-frame for cost
recovery was important, but bessed the question of whether
or not total cost pricing was ever Justified in the first
Place. The Consress was interested in phasing out the Fed's
role as a supplier of free services, and introducing more
Private sector competition. Unless one assumes the Congress
was interested in increasins the income of the shareholders
of private commercial banks, the Policy objective can be
interpreted as increased efficiency.
First, overuse of Fed services is discourased. That
is, the fees give a signal to users of the system that some
costs are incurred, thus forcing users to economize on their
use of the services. Secondly? the fees will create an
environment where Private sector firms can compete with the
Fed. To the desree that private firms can Provide the
services at a lower cost, society will benefit by the
expansion of the Private sector role.
Averase total cost (ATC) Pricins can thus be shown as
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an improvement over no prices. A number of other pricing
options exist, however, softie of which are clearly superior
to ATC pricing on efficiency grounds. The most obvious
alternative is strict marginal cost (MC) pricing. Since the
most efficient allocation of resources occurs when output is
expanded to the point where the cost of Producing the last
unit is Just equal to its price, it is widely recosnized by
economists that a first best pricing strategy sets price
equal to marginal cost.
When the long run cost curve for a service is flat,
exhibiting constant returns to scale, the lons-run marginal
cost curve is equal to the Iong-run ATC curve, and it makes
little difference which pricing rule is used. But where the
marginal cost of production is either increasins or
dec:reasins, there will be a diversence between the ATC and
the MC curve.
Where the supply curve is s
experiencins diseconomies of sca
lower than the MC Price. If the
sloping over the relevant ranse,
scale, the MC price wi I I be less
loping upward,
le, the ATC Pr
supply curve
and enjoyins
than the ATC
and
ice will be
is downward
economies of
Price. Thus,
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an ATC pricing rule will lead to Prices Which are either too
high or too low, as Judged by efficiency criteria.
An illustration of this Point is offered by usins a
translos Production function to derive supply curves for
three services offered by the fed; Check Processins,
Automatic Clearing House (AHC), and Wire Transfers. Check
Processins is seen to have diseconomies of scale, and an ATC
Pricing scheme would tend to underprice the service. The
ACH has economies of scale, and an ATC scheme Would
overprice the service. Finally, wire transfers are roushly
a constant cost service, and here ATC Would be fine.2 5
-64-
Averase Cost Pricing Versus Marsinal Cost Pricing
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in
the applications of marginal cost pricing to the Public
sector, and the circumstances when modifications of this
simple rule are in order. The most important Problem is the
case where marginal cost prices do not cover total costs.
Here it is necessary to find a subsidy for the service, or
to raise Prices in excess of marginal costs. Unless one
unrealistical ly assumes that subsidies can be financed by
lump sum taxes on persons it is inevitable that society will
suffer some welfare losses regardless of the approach taken.
The efficiency question then is to minimize the welfare
costs.
When the subsidy can come from any source, including
tax revenues, a number of financing strategies can be
Proposed, most of which also raise equity questions, as
money is taken from others to subsidize the users of bank
services.The common and relevant response is to impose a
constraint upon the service provider, such that total
revenues must equal total costs. The averase cost pricing
approach would, of course, meet this test.
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There are also other ways of meetins the revenue
constraint, whi le setting prices in ways to minimize welfare
losses. One such approach, Ramsey Pricing, requires that
Pr i ces di verse from mars i na I costs in inverse Proport i on to
the elasticity of demand for the service.26
Ramsey Pricins or Inverse Elasticity Pricins, not only
provides a systematic framework for settins Fed prices that
minimizes welfare losses, but it also provides a number of
insights into how different Pricing stratesies will affect
the total revenue and service and the absolute Prices
charged. For example, where the Fed provides two services
which share Joint overhead fixed costs, in some
circumstances it could lower Prices for both services by
scrapping the Present Pricing system, and al locate those
overhead costs among the two services in inverse Proportion
to the demand elasticities. This is siMPlY because a
service which has a hiShly elastic demand misht provide
greater total contribution to the overhead costs if its
price was lower than would be the case if the overhead was
allocated on the basis of sales as is Presently done.
An example of this principle can be found in the
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current Pricing practices of the commercial banks.
According to one source, "even casual conversations with
correspondent bankers make it clear that these effects of
own and cost-price elasticities of demand are implicitly
considered at larse, asgressive, money center correspondent
banks in determ inins a marketing strategy for correspondent
services." Where demand is inelastic, Prices are set
hisher. Where demand is highly elastic, banks are acutely
aware of the Penalty of raisins Prices too hish. Thus, even
in a world where "it is doubtful (explicity formulas) are
used to determine ... Prices" managers intuitively sense the
advantages of demand sensitive Pricing.
Ramsey Pricing is an important alternative to both the
Fed's current average cost Pricins Policy, and strict
marsinal cost Pricing. Under the Ramsey pricing option, the
Fed would begin with marginal costs, and then allocate any
overall revenue shortfall amons services in inverse
proportion to demand elasticities. The Fed would still be
able to meet the mandate for total cost recovery, whi le
pricing each service at no less than its marsinal cost, and
thus discourasing excess use of service lines which have
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diseconom ies of scale. Revenue shortfal Is, if any, which
resuIted from the marsinaI cost prices, wouId be at Iocated
amons services in a such a way as to minimize welfare
losses. That such a Pricing stratesy was not even
considered durins the recent rulemaking sussests that we are
on l y beg i nn i ng ou r Jou rney toward a more rat i ona I and
efficient pricing strategy for the Fed.
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VI Conclusion
We have observed the implementation of the
Congressional mandate that the Federal Reserve System set
explicit fees for its services. Three key aspects were
identified. The first was that the Fed relied on data from
the Planning and Control System (PACS) to allocate its own
costs of service operations to priced services. Because the
PACS represents a manasement and budgeting system designed
for the Fed's manasement objectives Prior to the inception
of the MCA, it was not readily equipped to Properly cost out
priced services. It is recommended therefore, that the Fed
re-examine the way it categorizes costs. It would make
sense that the Fed define some of the Priced services'as
activities. More importantly, the Fed must begin to
unbundle its, costs in order to Provide information necessary
to identify the capital to operating ratios for discrete
services. This would mean that the Fed adopt a standard
cost approach to its accounting system, which could be
oriented towards the objective of breaking out fixed and
variable costs across service lines. The need to unbundle
costs in this way becomes obvious when a system must
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simultaneously apply a fair rate of return to each of the
services being Priced.
This brings us to the second element of the Fed's
pricing scheme; the mark-up of its service fees by a factor
measuring the costs of taxes and financing that it would
incur if it were a Private sector firm. Althoush this
mark-up, called the Private sector adjustment factor, makes
sense conceptually, the entire approach to deriving it was
fundamental ly wrong. This resulted in an inaccurate and
therefore inefficient distribution of the costs of providins
Particular services. It was determined that the PSAF was an
incorrect Proxy for the Fed's cost of capital.
The capital structure from which the PSAF derives is
neither the Fed's capital structure, or the capital
structure of a sample of banks assumed to represent the
service mix of the Fed's operation. Rather, through the
Fed's effort to create a capital structure it became mired
in its attempt to match sources and uses of funds. The cost
of funds the Fed used was based on an assumption about the
debt to equity ratio of the twelve bank sample. Then the
Fed applied this cost to its own operating rather than
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capital costs. The rate of return that the Fed came up with
was then applied equally to all service lines resardless of
differentials in the capital-to-operatins-cost ratios of
these services. As an alternative it is recommended that
the Fed consider some of the applications of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model to determine a fair rate of return on
its invested capital. The CAPM approach would Permit the
Fed to distinguish between the levels of risk and return
unique to the provision of the discrete services, rather
than continuins its current Practice of overcharsins for
some services and undercharsins for for others - ignoring
different levels of risk between services.
Finally, we reviewed the uncritical acceptance by the
Fed of an averase cost Pricins scheme. We considered the
well accepted notion of marsinal cost Pricins, and then
considered a departure from marginal cost pricins called
Ramsey pricins, which may be an even better second best
solution for the Fed to try. If the Fed adhered to Ramsey
Pricins, it could distribute costs that would diverse from
the marsinal costs of services in inverse Proportion to the
respective elasticities of demand. The services that the
Fed, and banks in seneral offer, have varying levels of
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demand elasticities. With the revenue constraint, imPosed
by Congress, that total costs equal total revenue, the most
efficient way to allocate costs, Justify cross-subsidies,
and minimize welfare losses, may be to vary Prices the most
from marsinal cost where service demand is less elastic and
vary Prices the least from marsinal cost where service
demand is more elastic .
We have come down hard on the Fed's ways of
implementing its Pricing Policy. But althoush the Fed has
erred, two considerations deserve mention. First, the Fed
was responding to a Congressional mandate that not only
required full cost recovery, and asked that the Fed match
revenues and expenses, but also imposed an extremely
strinsent time-frame within which the Fed had to meet these
requirements. This did not allow the Fed the time to make
certain adJustments in its operations that may have earl ier
reconciled some of the pitfalls we have uncovered.
Second, the MCA has fostered change and innovation in
the way that the Fed approaches its service operations, both
internal I y and w i th respect to the ent i re bank i ns commun i ty.
The Fed is asking more questions about efficient ways to
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Price services, ways to unbundle its costs1 and about the
very role it should Play so as to enhance the efficiency of
the national Payments service system and better serve the
Public interest. Moreover, the MCA has led the bankins
community in seneral to confront these issues more
aggressively than they have in the Past. So, what on the
one hand can be viewed Justifiably as an outcome somewhat
lacking in efficiency, can on the other hand be considered
as a maJor step forward. Change is an incremental process,
including making and undoing mistakes. The stase has surely
been set for an improved Payments mechanism. We eagerly
await the development of the next round of Pricin reform
debates.
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Glossary
Avai labi I ity:
The amount of time it takes for the Fed to credit the
account of the depository institution which is col lecting
money on the checks it sent to the Fed for processins.
Automated Clearing House (ACH):
The national electronic Payment services includins direct
deposits and pre-authorized transfers amons customers'
demand deposit accounts to all regions of the United States.
There are 36 AHC facilities.
AdJustment Activity:
This is one of the cost catesories for check Processins
which is included in the Fed's Planning and Control System
(PACS). AdJustments are required any time there is an error
in the creditins of accounts during the check Collection
process. There are controlled adjustments which result from
misroutins or error by the Fed and there are uncontrol led
adjustments which result from Processing errors made by
other financial institutions.
Adjustments, Net:
This is a balance sheet account of the Federal Reserve
System and was included as one of the asset accounts
comprisins the asset base used in the derivation of the
Private Sector Adjustment Factor.
Bank of First Deposit:
This is the bank which has accepted deposits from its
customers either drawn on itself (on-us) or on other banks.
All checks drawn on other banks (on other) are channeled
throush the check collection system, eventually, to the
Payor bank.
Cash Letter:
A bundle of checks wrapped in a letter stating the face
value of all the items enclosed. Cash letters are typically
differentiated by the types of checks inside (checks drawn
on local banks only). These cash letters are common ly
referred to as deposit types. It is the deposit types that
are subject to fees under the MCA mandate of Fed Pricing.
Collecting Institution:
Also referred to as the deposi
seekins Payment of the checks
may also be the bank of first
Point for checks into the coll
ting institution, this bank is
it has on deposit. This bank
deposit, acting as the entry
ection system.
Commercial Bank:
This term wil I be used to refer to a state or federal ly
chartered bank and would include a bank of first deposit 7
depositing institution, Payor bank, Payee bank, and
correspondent bank.
Correspondent:
This term refers to a Particular functional relationship
between two banks - one which provided the check services to
the other (respondent) bank. The correspondent is typically
a larger bank within a metropolitan area. The trend towards
regional correspondents means that financial institutions
are mersins in order to Provide a wider ranse of
services to a larger geographic area.
Credit:
This term wil l
The account is
funds.
refer to the Fed's crediting of an account.
increased by the amount of the borrowed
Debit:
This term wilI refer to the Fed's debiting an account. The
account is decreased by the appropriate amount.
Depositing Institution:
The bank which brings its business to the Fed.
context of this Paper, a depositing institution
refer to the bank which is Purchasing the check
services from the Fed.
In the
will always
co Illect ion
Deposit Types:
Also referred to as cash letters. These are the categories
of the services which are subJect to fees under the MCA
mandate of Fed pricing. The specific deposit types are
City, Country, Mixed, Non-Machinable, Package Sort, Group
Sort.
Deferred AvailablitY:
When availability is not "immediate"(same-day) it is
referred to as "deferred". Usual ly this means a delay of
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1.5 days.
Deferred Credit:
This is a balance sheet account which represents the face
value of the checks that are in process of collection and
have been granted availabi.lity within an agreed upon time.
This account is not Part of the Float.
ing Institution:
the institution
ion. This check
that is depositins the check for
is drawn on the Payor bank (Drawee
Difference Account:
This is a balance sheet account which refers to the
uncol lectable/ unpayable amounts because of an
out-of-balance situation arising primarily from:
1) Mistakes made by the commercial bank in reportins the
exact amount of the checks deposited for collection.
2) Any difference rePorted during the shipment between
federal reserve banks.
3) Internal settlement operations includins balancing paid
savings bonds, cafeteria receiPts, and Postmaster's
deposits.
Drawee Bank:
The entity responsible for Payment of the amount designated
on the check.
Drawer Bank:
The entity presenting the check.
El
A
fl
or
ectronic Fund Transfer (EFT)
communications network which facil
ow of funds; this flow may be via
Automated TelIler Machines.
End-Po i nt
Refers to an individual
will be responsible for
depositing institution
itates the electronic
mire transfers, ACH,
bank. Usually this is the bank which
Payment of the check which the
submitted to the Fed for Processins.
End-Point Sorting
This aspect of check processing refers to
by a high speed reader sorter which sorts
"down" to Payor banks. A Fed facility wi
the task Performed
all the checks
I1 end-point sort
Depos i t
This is
cot lect
banks).
-76-
certain types of deposits. The Fed will not end-point sort
checks for Payor banks in other Fed districts; In this case
the local Fed will send checks to the second Fed for
end-point sorting.
Equivalent items:
Equivalent items represent the number of items Processed
during their first time throush a reader-sorter Plus .25
times the number of items that must be Processed a second or
more times through a reader-sorter. Ordinari ly items in
various deposit types must be Processed more than once
because they could not be sorted to their final destination
on their first run (first run throush the machine). This
situation usually arises because the number of destinations
in the deposit types exceed the number of sorting Pockets in
a reader/sorter. Consequently, high volume destinations are
sorted on the first run through a machine, and several
Pockets, which were used to collect lower volume
destinations, are run again and sorted to final destination.
Equivalent items are used to allocate Processing expenses
among deposit types. Its calculation incorporates the
Processing characteristics of how many extra times an item
is Processed on a reader-sorter times 24%. The reason a
factor of 100% was not used is because check Processing is
not all machine related and this method of cost allocation
more accurately reflects the resources used in check
processing. For example, non-machine activities include
receiving checks from couriers, manual ly segregating cash
letters into deposit types, Pre-reader/sorter Preparation,
Pre-settlement Preparation, actual setttlement, check
wrapping, and Presentation to courier or local clearing
house. Since non-machine activities are done onlyonce for a
check, Fed officials believe it inappropriate to use the
absolute number of items Processed when chechs must be run
throush a machine two or more times when al locating costs
across deposit types. The 25% factor, therefore, sives
weight to the non-machine activities in allocating expenses.
Fed Facility:
Any Federal Reserve Bank site which Provides check
processins services.
Fed, FR Bank, FR Facility, FRB.
All these abbreviations are used interchangeably to refer to
a Federal Reserve Bank. The term Federal Reserve would
include all banks in the Federal Reserve System. Reference
will be made to a Fed facility in the context of the check
ProcessinS service only.
-77-
F I oat:
In the most narrow sense7 the Fed float refers to the
dollar value of all items which have been credited to the
appropriate account based upon the asreed upon availability
schedule, but which are not actual ly received by the Fed
from the Payor bank by the time availability has been
granted. The value of the Fed float can be calculated from
two balance sheet accounts by subtracting the deferred
avai labi I ity account from the Items in the Process of
Collection account.
Under the MCA the Fed is required to either price or
eliminate the Float. It has chosen the latter course. The
Fed categorizes float according to positive and negative
float. It is seeking to eliminate negative float.
Negative float or debit float occurs when the Fed can not
collect funds on the same day on which credit was passed!
the Fed is owed money. Positive float is created when the
Fed collects funds sooner than the funds have been granted
to the deposit bank.
Handlin :
Any operation required in the processing of the checks.
This term is used interchangeably with "processing".
Immediate Avai lability:
Also referred to as same day availabiliv. When credit is
granted on the same day as the item is deposited with the
Fed facility.
Item-Pass Ratio:
A ratio of the number of extra times a check must pass
through a high-speed reader-sorter relative to the fixed
number of individual items received by the Fed facility.
Items:
Refers to an individual check.
Local Clearing House:
A clearing house which is located in an area which includes
the paying and collecting banks. Checks drawn on the
respective institutions are exchanged daily at the clearing
house.
National / Nations Payments Mechanism:
Refers to the network/system of institutions/individuals
facilitating essentially all types of Payment system
transactions (flow of funds) between and among institutions
and individuals.
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Non-Par Bankins Practices:
Non-par bankins occurs when a Percentase deduction is taken
from the face value of the checks Prior to the delivery of
the funds.
NOW:
A NOW Draft Account or Nesotiable Order Withdrawal is a
demand deposit account which earns interest.
On-Others:
Checks drawn on a bank other than the one Processing the
checks.
On-Us:
Checks drawn on the bank which also does the Processins of
the check.
Payee bank:
The entity which is owed the face value of the check.
Payor Bank:
The bank responsible for making the payment. Same as the
drawee. This is the institution which has the funds upon
which its customers have drawn the checks. Once the check
is Presented by the depositing bank, or its asent (i.e., the
Fed), the check must be Paid by the Payor bank.
Presentment:
The process of a depositins bank or its asent presenting a
check to the Payor bank for payment.
Return:
Refers to the expenses in the handling of checks which are
returned unpaid. These items may have been Processed by an
RCPC branch or Fed office.
Settlement:
Refers to any activity related to the balancins of work
comins in and soins out of the Fed.
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Exhibit I: Check Deposit Types and Characteristics
Deposit Type
City:
RCPC:
Country:
Other Fed:
Characteristics
Location & Transportation: Payor banks located
within Fed city. No transportation since
checks are picked up at clearing house.
Processing Characteristics: Low machine use
since often the number of city banks is
similar to the number of Pockets (24) in a
machine. Many Points can be end-point
sorted on a first Pass.
Availability: Immediate since checks can be
Presented soon after processing.
Price: Price is relatively low reflectins low
machine use and no transportation costs.
Location & Transportation: Payor banks located
in RCPC zone, beyond Perimeter of city area.
Distance therefore requires that
transportation be used to Present checks.
Processing Characteristics: More machine use
because there are ususally a greater number
of end Points relative to Pockets on a
machine (24), thereby requiring many checks
to so throush a machine before beins
end-point sorted.
Availabi lity: Immediate, distance is not that
sreat to Prevent Presentation of the checks
on the same day as received by the Fed.
Price: Price is moderate reflectins higher
machine use and transportation costs.
Location & Transportation: Payor banks located
beyond Perimeter of city and RCPC areas.
Di stance, therefore, requ i res transportation
for Presentment.
Processing Characteristics: Same as for RCPC.
Availability: Next day. Distance Prevents
Presentation of checks the same day as
received by the Fed.
Location & Transportation: Payor bank located
another Fed district, therefore requiring
extensive transportation to send checks to
receiving Fed district office.
in
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Processins Characteristics: Machine use is
moderate since there can be as many as 49
Points to sort down to (i.e. Various Fed
offices located throushout the U.s.) AIso,
processing is required to end Point sort at
receivins Fed.
Availability: Next day. Distance prevents
Presentation of checks the same day as
received by the Fed.
Price: Price is high reflecting processins costs
at bis Fed offices and transportation
betweeen initial receiving Fed and second
Fed that makes Presentation.
Mixed: Location & Transportation: Location and
transportation vary because this deposit
type is comprised of city, RCPC, country,
and other Fed checks.
Processing Characteristics: Machine use is hish
since cash letter must first be sorted down
to deposit type before they are end point
sorted to Payor bank.
Availability: Typically next day after deposit.
Price: Reflects the hish machine use and also
Possible extensive transportation to Present
checks.
Non-machinable:
Location & Transportation: These characteristics
vary because Payor banks are in city, RCPC,
country or other Fed areas.
Processins Characteristics: Very labor
intensive since most items must be hand fed
into low speed Proof machines.
Availability: Next day or two days. Labor
intensive aspect Prevents quick processing. Two
day appi ies to country and other Fed
endpoints.
Price: Is highest of all Prices due to labor
intensive characteristics.
Packase Sort:
Location & Transportation: Payor bank located in
city, country, RCPC, and other Fed areas.
Transportation, therefore, also varies
according to location.
Processing Characteristics: No Fed Processins
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Group Sort:
since depositing bank as endpoint sorted
checks to Payor banks. Also, later deposit
deadline because of pre-processins.
Avai lability: Credit Passed according to same
availability schedule for city, RCPC,
country, and other Fed schedules listed
above.
Price: Lowest price, which reflects non-machine
processins by Fed.
Location & Transportation: Payor banks located
in city, RCPC, country, and other Fed areas.
Transportation, therefore, varies according
to location.
Processing Characteristics: Limited Fed
Processing since depositing bank has sorted
checks down to banks represented in the
designated group. Also, later deposit
deadline because of pre-processing.
Availability: Credit Passed according to
avai labi I ity schedule for city, country,
RCPC, and other Fed schedules listed above.
Price: A little higher than Packase sort, since
items were sorted to a number of
institutions rather than one end-point.
However,, lower to reflect some
Pre-processing.
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APPENDIX 1
The Pricing Worksheet: How data from the Planning and
Control System is used to derive unit fees.
The pricing of commercial check processins services
involves the establishment of explicit fees for different
deposit types on a Per item basis. These deposit types are
fully explained in Exhibit 1. They include city items, RCPC's,
country items, mixed cash letters, other Fed, and Packase sort.
Basic Steps Involved in Calculatins Unit Prices
AlI data are based on PACS budseted/projected
expenses and vol ume counts.
Step I: Asresating total expenses to be allocated
services.
1981
to Priced
A) The total expenses are recorded for the commercial
check Processins service line which includes direct,
support, and overhead expenses for all activities'
processins and fine sort/ adjustments/ returns.
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B) Subtracting Out of Shipping Related Expenses
1) Expenses for shipments between Fed offices in the
same district and between Fed offices in different
districts are subtracted out from total expenses
calculated in Step 1,A. These expenses are added
back after the PSAF has been applied to the subtotal
of costs/ expenses Per deposit type. Since shippins
services are contracted out to a Private service
provider the tax and financing costs are assumed to
already be reflected in the shipping charges to the
Fed. It would therefore be double counting to
include the shipping costs for each deposit type,
and, at the same time, apply the PSAF to these
costs.
2) The reimbursement expenses which had been granted
to depository institutions (pre-MCA) for makins use
of direct sends, are also subtracted out. These
expenses will not be added back, because they are
not incurred in the Pricin environment.
3) In-house mail expenses are subtracted out. These
expenses relate to the cost of handling consolidated
shipments only. Because these costs'vary across
districts it is susested that each Fed Office
estimate the in-house trai I expenses which would
include overhead, equipment, Personnel , etc.
Step II: Step Down Allocation of Commercial Check
Processing Service Line Expenses to the Activity
Level.
The expense figure for the commercial check Processing
service line less shippinS determined in Step I
represents the total expenses Which Will be allocated
to each check activity and ultimately to each deposit
tYpe.
A) All direct, supports and District Project expenses
are first allocated to each check activity.
Processins and fine sort are combined for the
Purposes of the pricins exercise. The other
activities are returns and adJustments.
Step III: Estimate of Check Volume/Number of Items
Processed
A) A total volume amount is determined. This includes
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alI items Processed by a Federal Reserve Office,
either shipped to another office in the same
district, or to an office outside the district which
includes the Payor bank. 1) In order to estimate the
number of items received by consolidated shipment it
is sussested that the Fed assume that there are 352
items Per pound.
B) The total volume of items Processed is recorded.
This is an estimate of the next year7 s volume. Then,
based on the current year's actual volume, a Percent
break-out by deposit type is calculated. This is
applied to the Projected volume total in order to
arrive at the Projected number of items by deposit
type. (Defined as number of items Processed.)
C) A total for the number of equivalent items is also
determined. This is equal to the total number of
items actually Processed, Plus a Percentase mark-up
which accounts for the additional amount of times an
item must be resorted in order to separate out all
items by individual account.
D) The total number of equivalent items is al located
to deposit types according to the same ratio used in
Step II, B.
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Step IV: Allocation of Activity Expenses to Deposit Types/Priced
Services
A) The totals for returns and adjustments activity
recorded in Step IIA are allocated across all
deposit types based on the volume ratio of the number
of items in each deposit type to the total Projected
number of items Processed. The equivalent item ratio
is not used here because the amount of adjustment and
return activity is Proportional to the number of
individual checks received for Processins.
B) For the allocation of check processins and fine
sort expenses, all expenses for activities are first
al located only to the non-machinable and Package sort
deposit types. This allocation is based on actual
"internal records", for each Fed Off ice. i. e.
number hours/Personnel costs, etc. In this way, the
actual resources required for Processins this deposit
type are are more accurately reflected in the cost
al location. Non-machinables are the most expensive
of all Processins activities.
C) The expenses which remain after the subtraction of
expenses associated with non-machinable and Packase
sort, are then allocated to the group sort deposit
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type. This allocation is based on the volume ratio
of equivalent items for group sort to the total
equivalent items.
D) AI remain ing expenses after subtract ins out
expenses associated with non-machinable, Package
sort? and group sort, are then allocated according to
the volume ratio of the equivalent number of items
Per deposit type to the total number of equivalent
items.
Step V: Allocation of Overhead Expense
A) The total overhead expense for the commercial check
Processins line is allocated to each deposit type
according to an expense ratio. This ratio is based
on the total expense for each activity less shippins
by deposit type to the total expense for all
activities. (i.e. The subtotal of expenses which
has been calculated for each deposit type based on
the Particular volume ratio and expenses sesresated
by activitY, is the numerator. The denominator is
the summation of expenses for all activities in the
commercial check Processins service line.
Step VI: Application of the Private Sector AdJustment Factor
A) The subtotal of the total expenses is calculated for
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each deposit type. These expenses include direct and
support costs, for processi ns, fine-sort,
adJustments, and returns, and the adjustment for
overhead which were all determined in Steps I-VI.
B) This subtotal is then increased by the PSAF.
Step VII: Adding Back Shipping Costs
A) The total shipping costs determined in Step I are
allocated across each deposit type according to the
appropriate volume ratio. Shippins expenses are not
allocated to the city deposit type. These items do
not require shipment. Shipping expenses for country,
RCPC, mixed, non-machinable, Packase and group sort
are allocated according to a volume ratio of the
number of items Per deposit type to the total number
of items Processed.
Step VIII: Calculation of Per Unit Cost
A) The total expenses for each deposit type, inclusive
of the PSAF, Plus shipping costs, are divided by the
number of individual items Processed Per deposit
typ~es
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Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing", Volume 60,
December, 1970. pp. 265-283.
27) One overall obJection to Ramsey Pricing is that it
results in uncompensated transfers of Costs to the
users of services with the more inelastic demand.
However, this criticism is somewhat missuided when
considering the application of Ramsey Pricing to the
pricing of Fed services. A Ramsey allocation scheme
can in fact improve the allocation of costs with
respect to all Parties by leading to a reduction in
Prices; As a result of initial Price discrimination,
given the condition of declining marginal costs or
constant costs, demand may increase for services Priced
closer to marginal cost, and therefore induce lower
unit costs and hence, Prices. Moreover, bank services
are typically viewed as Packages of services sold to a
Particular customer. As such, the Policy of
cross-subsidization resulting from Ramsey Pricing need
not necessarily create direct subsidies to only certain
users, and in turn greater burden for others. Rather,
Ramsey pricing may Permit cross-subsidies between
services, that are offset with respect to the total
cost/price of these services.
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